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Since the enactment of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act 1
effective April 28, 1969, its degree of impact upon the subdivision land industry
and consumer protection remains inconclusive. On one hand, it has resulted in
the assembly and filing by industry of voluminous amounts of information with
the federal government ultimately digested in the form of a document known as
a Property Report. Such filings under the Act reflect an apparent legitimacy of
this historically unbridled American marketing enterprise. On the other hand,
the Act has nurtured an increasing awareness in a gullible and affluent American
consumer that the purchase of land, particularly "second home," recreational or
investment land is an involved and often precarious undertaking. The extent to
which the industry has been purged of abuse and the degree to which a buyer
need no longer beware, remains equivocal. The Act emerged from instances
where ambitious venders produced sales and revenue from unaware buyers, who
contributed to their own unawareness by failing to read contractual documents
and by being otherwise ignorant of what they were getting into. Approximately
two years after the Act's passage there is scant evidence that these same buyers
now read the contract they sign and only cavalierly peruse the Property Report
which Congress intended they read. Unfortunately, by a technicality in the Act,
a buyer's signature on the dotted line of the contract may waive his legislative
right to void his contract for failure to receive and understand the Property
Report.2 There are, however, some hopeful signs on the consumer horizon.
Numerous public inquiries to HUD now ask whether a particular land developer
has filed under the Act and an increasing number of prospective buyers are aware
that a "report" of some shape or form is supposed to be given them when they
buy.
On the industry side, ignorance of the legislation by developers of the need
to comply with the Act is no longer as understandable as during the early days of
enactment. An undetermined, but possibly sizeable, number of developers have
yet to meet the law's requirements. Unfortunately this failure rests in part on
legal counsel not thoroughly knowledgeable with the nature of the legislation and
its requirements and counsel's overanxiousness to assuage or exempt his client
from the burdens of compliance. Developers have been repeatedly penalized as
a result of their attorneys' erroneous advice that they are exempt and need not
file a Statement of Record with the Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration.-
* Realty Specialist, Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration, United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development. A.B. 1957, University of Notre Dame; LL.B. 1960,
Georgetown University; M.A. 1968, Wayne State University.
1 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1720 (1971 Cur. Supp.).
See 24 C.F.R. § 1710.110 (1970).
2 For a statutory description of the document hereinafter referred to as the Property
Report, see Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702 (a) (10) (1971 Cum.
Supp. ).
3 Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration is hereinafter referred to as OILSR.
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Such advice is partially due to the language in which it is drafted, the newness
of the statute and the consequent absence of precedent. In this connection some
discussion is merited.
II. Exemptions in General
During slightly more than two years, the OILSR has gotten a very large
number of requests or claims of exemption from the Act. As noted previously
many of these requests have stemmed from the efforts of overconscientious and
ingenious legal counsel. Others are the result of the natural resentment of the
private sector against governmental interference and regulatory infiltration. The
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act is not, and has never been, what could
be characterized as regulatory. It is simply and solely a disclosure statute. It
does not require a developer to do anything but "tell it like it is." Where a
developer makes a fair and full disclosure he is subject to no requirements other
than those which generally existed prior to the Act, relating to fraud and deceit.
Of course, if a developer engages in acts of fraud and deceit, the Act does provide
for direct federal intervention and sanction, but in this capacity the Act is no
more regulatory than an embezzlement statute. With this in mind, developers
and their counsel, meeting the Act for the first time, should approach it from a
positive standpoint, considering the advantageous possibilities of filing the
required Statement of Record.
The Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration has noted that a rather
minute number of developers are exempt from the Act under development
structures which existed prior to the passage of the Act. Those that have changed
their operation to secure exemption may have ultimately expended more time and
energy in qualifying for exemption or in securing a favorable Exemption Advisory
Opinion than they would have exerted by affirmative compliance and filing of a
Statement of Record. Many developers now find themselves severely hampered
by restrictive marketing programs, undue financial burdens and nonlogical
development covenants and restrictions. Ironically, many of these developers
are being bypassed by the purchasing consumer who is apprehensive of a seller
who does not provide him with a Property Report apparently required by the
United States Government. Enlightened developers and their counsel have
become cognizant of the salutary effects of the use of the Report as a valuable
marketing device and as a rein on overambitious sales agents. Intelligent use of
the Report by developers has resulted in a direct proportional decrease in the
rate of repossessed lots and in lessening the numbers of disappointed lot owners
and attendant adverse publicity.
It should be stressed in connection with requests for Exemption Advisory
Opinions' that the Opinions merely reflect the current OILSR interpretation of
the Act; that they are merely "advisory" in character; that they can in no way
abrogate the rights conferred upon purchasers; and that they plainly do not make
nonexempt sales exempt.
4 For an outline of the procedure to be used for obtaining Exemption Advisory Opinions,
see 24 C.F.R. § 1710.15 (1970).
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In summary, developers and their counsel are well advised to venture
cautiously into the exemption area. An initial judgment should be made to see
if the disadvantages of filing under the Act are not outweighed by the benefits
resulting from filing and the satisfaction of being reasonably sure of not violating
a federal law and being subject to various contingent liabilities.
III. Evasion or Avoidance
The distinction between "evasion" and "avoidance" is legally fine, like
most questions of intent. It is relatively simple to cite extreme examples of each.
A developer who replats his subdivision into lots of five acres or more and sells
nothing smaller thereafter effectively "avoids" the Act by qualifying for exemp-
tion under Section 1403(a) (2).' On the other hand, a developer who begins to
sell renewable $60 club memberships of one year for the exclusive use of camping,
which carry an initiation fee of $3,000, is, for purposes of exemption under
Section 1710.10(m) of the Regulations,' clearly evading under the prefatory
language of Section 1403(a)7 of the Act. In each case one must determine
whether the object being sold or leased has itself changed, such as lots of five or
more acres, or whether merely the means of disposing of the land has been altered.
This reasoning, however, is not easily applied to the "intrastate" exemption
except to the extent that one could say that the lots are capable of being purchased
solely by situs state residents. In actuality of course the key to this exemption is
the alteration of the means of disposal of the lots, due to the use of the word
"offering," in Section 1710.10(1)8 of the Regulatory exemption. Currently, the
OILSR looks at the ratio borne by out of state sales to total sales, in addition to
examining the use of means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce, or of the mails. A ratio in excess of several percent raises
an a priori presumption that the development is "interstate" and subject to the
Act. Some developers have currently restricted all of their sales to residents of the
situs state with the intention of eventually expanding and filing when the in-
state market is exhausted. On the surface this would not appear to be objection-
able. However, when a large amount of out of state sales in the subdivision are
eventually made, the subdivision can no longer be characterized as one where
sales are "entirely or almost entirely intrastate," nor that there ever was a
"common promotional plan" in the particular "subdivision" to sell entirely intra-
state. The subsequent status of the prior in-state sales is conjectural. It can be
said that the Exemption Advisory Opinions rendered to date contain philosophy
which looks dimly upon subdivisions which claim to be partly exempt and
partly not exempt, due to the term "common promotion plan." The application
of this term in the exemption area also appears to negate the possibility of group-
ing exemptions in connection with one subdivision. For example the Section
5 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702(a) (2) (1971 Cum.
Supp.).
6 Interstate Land Sales Registration, 24 C.F.R. § 1710.10(m) (1970).
7 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702(a) (1971 Cum. Supp.).
See 24 C.F.R. § 1710.110 (1970).
8 Interstate Land Sales Registration, 24 C.F.R. § 1710.10(1) (1970).
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1403 (a) (2)' exemption has been administratively interpreted to mean that "each
and all" lots in the subdivision must be five or more acres in size. As a result,
grouping of other exemptions appears impossible in connection with this exemp-
tion. Other attempts at grouping, such as splitting a subdivision in half, selling
half intrastate and the other half "free and clear," or with an obligation to erect
structures, appear precarious considering the words "common promotional plan"
and might easily be construed to constitute an evasion of the Act.
IV. Particular Exemptions
Some of the difficulty presented by the "intrastate exemption" is expected to
end by the enactment of a proposed amendment to the Regulations which will
restrict the exemption to subdivisions of less than 300 lots and will require those
who qualify to file an affirmative request for an "exemption order." The virtual
elimination of this exemption does not entirely resolve the matter however. If
a developer is not covered by the Act it is meaningless to talk of his being exempt
from the Act. Exemption considerations only arise after it is determined that a
particular developer is within the Act, but for one reason or another, under
Section 1403,"0 is exempt from the Act's requirements. Thus, if a developer does
not in any way "make use of any means or instruments of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce, or of the mails" he is not under the jurisdic-
tion of the Act. Such a developer is not exempt by virtue of being entirely
intrastate. He is not within the Act because he does not make use of any means
or instruments in "interstate commerce" or of the "mails." However, what acts
constitute "interstate commerce" may not be so readily discernible. Tradition-
ally, the courts have broadly interpreted the term and have held businesses to be
within the Commerce Clause or in interstate commerce and subject to regulation
even where the business only indirectly affects such commerce. In Wickard v.
Filburn"1 a home-grown wheat crop consumed by livestock solely within the state
was ruled to be subject to regulation under the Agricultural Adjustment Act
and under the Commerce Clause, because intrastate production and consump-
tion of wheat affected the market price throughout the United States. With
regard to the regulation of land, it is obvious that land is incapable of any
passage across state borders. It is thus equally obvious that the jurisdiction of the
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act relates to matters involving the transac-
tion surrounding the land, such as interstate solicitation, passage of citizens of one
state into the situs state as well as passage of documents and other materials in-
volving the means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce. Construed broadly it is doubtful if many developers conduct their
business without employing any of these means. In addition, Section 14 04 ' of
the Act goes even further to include the use of the "mails." It is almost incon-
ceivable that any developer, in addition to qualifying as not being in interstate
9 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.G.A. § 1702(a) (2) (1971 Gum.
Supp.).
10 Id. at § 1702.
11 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
12 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 5 U.S.O.A. § 1703(a) '(1971 Gum. Supp.).
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commerce, could also qualify as not using the mail. With this in mind counsel
and developers might be well advised to entirely discard any intentions to preclude
the Act on this basis.
Another proposed amendment which appears likely to be enacted involves
a request for an "order" of regulatory exemption. It is based upon the discre-
tionary power of the Secretary to exempt lots otherwise covered by the Act, where
regulation is not necessary in the public interest by reason of the small number
of lots involved or the limited character of the offering.13 Several statutory
amendments are also under consideration and will be commented upon later.
While the exemption provided by Section 1403 (a) (1)14 of the Act appears
relatively self-explanatory, the simple conclusion that subdivisions containing less
than fifty lots are exempt is complicated by the use of the words "common
promotional plan" and "subdivision," as the latter term is defined in Section
1402(3)." 5 Thus, the number of lots currently being offered or the number of
lots currently divided is of no relevance if there is an eventual plan to offer a
total of fifty or more, or if the land is proposed to be divided into fifty or more
lots. Obviously no developer would be covered by the Act if he was permitted to
sell off individual blocks of less than fifty lots. Also, in view of the definition of
"subdivision" it is fruitless to designate different sections of the same subdivision
by diverse names if in reality the total land is being offered as one "common
-promotional plan" and, as the Act makes clear, "contiguity" of the land is not
crucial in finding an offering to be part of the same plan. A developer offering
fifty or more noncontiguous campsites scattered throughout a state, or throughout
various states, would be covered by the Act, and all of the campsites, proximate to
each other or not, would be required to have a statement filed on their behalf.
The exemption provided by Section 1403 (a) (3) 6 appears less vague than.
some of the others. A number of developers have received favorable Exemption
Advisory Opinions on this basis. Such opinions, however, have consistently
maintained that in addition to unconditionally obligating the seller to erect a
structure within two years of the date of sale, he must extend the obligation to
other facilities incident to the structure, such as water and sewer accommodations.
The Opinions have likewise indicated that in order for condominium sales to
secure this exemption, the obligation to erect within two years dates back to the
time of the first unit sale in the condominium, rather than two years from the
sale of the particular unit. This interpretation results from the legal concept that
each purchaser of a condominium unit has an undivided fractional ownership
in all of the condominium facilities, easements and common areas, and hence
the required obligation to construct the entire condominium complex within two
years of the first unit sale.
Since the effective date of the amendment to Section 1403 (a) (10) of the Act
on December 24, 1969,17 and Section 1710.10(j) of the Regulations on April 14,
13 See, e.g., id. at '§ 1702(b).
14 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702(a)(1) (1971 Cum.
Supp.).
15 Id. at§ 1701(3).
16 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702(a) (3) (1971 Curn.
Supp.).
17 I. at§ 1702(a) (10).
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1970,8 a developer must annually file materials with the Secretary to qualify for
the exemption. He cannot simply "sit tight" claiming that the land is un-
encumbered and that all purchasers personally inspected the land at the time of
sale. A particular area of difficulty regarding this Section of the Act involves the
provisions requiring that any reservations or restrictions on the property be
"beneficial" and "enforceable by all lot owners." What is beneficial to one
purchaser need not be so to another, and the absence of some restrictions not
strictly beneficial to all lot owners may result in a poorly planned and unwork-
able subdivision. Such may also be true of the enforceability requirement. It is
often desirable to retain in the developer certain restrictions until such time as
the subdivision and its facilities can be feasibly transferred to the property owners.
Unfortunately, some developers are tailoring their subdivisions and eliminating
prior reservations simply to qualify for the exemption, an outcome hardly intended
by Congress when it enacted this exemption.
Recently several developers in seeking this exemption have divided their
subdivision into various offerings and sections, prescribing different restrictions
in the several sections, enforceable only by the lot owners in the individual sec-
tions. Such portioning obviously fails to meet the requirement that all of the
restrictions be enforceable by all lot owners in the "subdivision," as that term is
defined in Section 1402(3)."
Brief comment is useful concerning a subsection of Section 1710.10120
which has been frequently misread by counsel and their clients. Subsection (9)
of this Section contains language to the effect that "the contract of sale requires
delivery of a deed to the purchaser within 120 days of signing the contract." This
is intended merely to fix the date of sale for purposes of determining at what point
the land must be "free and clear of all liens, encumbrances, and adverse claims."
It does not require a developer to deliver a deed to a buyer within 120 days of
sale. What it does mean is that a developer has 120 days from the date of sale to
unencumber the property and still qualify for the exemption. Thus, if the land
is not encumbered at the time the sales contract is signed, this subsection has no
relevance in qualifying for the exemption. This of course is equally true of the
language contained in part (b) of this subsection.
V. Filing Matters
Statements of Record are filed with the OILSR and assigned to the Exami-
nation Division for review. A properly prepared Statement should normally
expect to receive an effective date letter within ten to fifteen days from the date
it is filed. This period will vary depending upon current volume filed with the
office. Subsequent offerings of lots in a subdivision currently effective are sub-
mitted as consolidations to the prior filing and incorporate by reference all of the
new information with the effective Statement of Record.
A particular problem arises concerning the expiration or withdrawal of a
18 Interstate Land Sales Registration, 24 C.F.R. § 1710.10(j) (1970).
19 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1701(3) (1971 Cur. Supp.).
20 Interstate Land Sales Registration, 24 C.F.R. § 1710.101 (1970).
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Statement of Record which has become effective. One can only speculate upon
the status of a Statement of Record for a subdivision after all of its lots have been
sold. As a document of historical relevance it is maintained by the OILSR for
an indeterminate period. However, in a large subdivision where a considerable
amount of forfeitures and repossessions are likely to occur it is obvious that the
Statements possess more than mere historical value. Indeed, some subdivisions
have been filed with the OILSR which were entirely sold at the date of filing.
The status of a Statement of Record which a developer wishes to withdraw
is only slightly less speculative. At least one known developer who had an effective
Statement of Record for his subdivision decided to restrict all future sales to
residents of the situs state rather than submit consolidations for additional lots.
The developer did not notify the OILSR of his intention to withdraw the
Statement of Record which was currently effective. Query: What is the status
of the sales of the lots upon which there was no effective filing? It can be said
that the OILSR frowns upon a subdivision being both exempt and not exempt,
particularly where there remain lots in the subdivision subject to the effective
Statement of Record which are being marketed in conjunction with lots being
offered solely to residents of the situs state.
Section 1407(c) 21 of the Act requires a developer to file an amendment to
an effective Statement of Record where a change occurs affecting any material
fact required to be contained in the Statement, and Subsection (d) provides for
suspension of effective Statements where the filing contains an untrue statement or
omits to state a material fact. Response to this section of the Act by developers
and their legal counsel has been sorely delinquent. A plausible explanation of
this failure partly lies in the interpretation of what constitutes a "material
change" or a "material fact." Certainly anything is "material" which concerns
a matter in the Statement which relates either to the deletion or addition of
promises being made by a developer- to purchasers, as well as any financial
circumstances affecting, such promise, either by way of the capability of the
developer to fulfill the promise or involving financial obligation upon a buyer.
For example, a currently effective Statement of Record indicated, as part of the
effective Property Report, that buyers' and property owners' sole financial re-
sponsibility consisted in assessments for maintenance facilities. In reality, it was
subsequently found that the developer, while in control of the property owners'
association, obligated the association to the extent of several hundred thousand
dollars to be paid to the developer by the association for having constructed a
lavish clubhouse. When the association was transferred to the property owners
they learned that the clubhouse, which materially induced them to purchase the
land, had yet to be paid for and was to be paid for by them out of assessments
already severely depleted by other maintenance costs. The developer's failure to
cite the existence of this large encumbrance constituted a failure to disclose a
"material" fact and as such was a direct violation of Subsection (d). Admin-
istrative action resulted, requiring immediate amendment of the Statement; its
voluntary suspension prior to amendment; and providing purchasers the option
to revoke their contracts. We suspect that property owners' associations will
21 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1706(c) (1971 Cum. Supp.).
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eventually generate the largest single category of complaints involving nondis-
closure. Property owners' associations are not unlike other public or municipal
bodies except to the extent that they are private entities, frequently lacking the
authority and power provided legislatively to public bodies, but subject to many
of the same problems in organizing a community. If a developer has initially
set adequate guidelines and realistically equipped the association, a viable private
entity is possible. If he has not, eventual chaos is the likely result. When develop-
ments mature timewise to the extent that the lot owners are given control of the
association, inherent problems, lying dormant prior to passage of control, will
suddenly surface. Most lot purchasers have little idea of the extent to which
they bind themselves by simply executing a contract of sale which contains an
obligation to be bound by the rules and regulations of a developer-association.
When they purchase, the association is almost always under the entire and un-
fettered control of the developer who can change or extend such rules at will.
Normally only after all of the land in the development has been marketed does
the transfer of the association to the lot owners occur and often such lot owners
only then discover the degree to which they are obligated. They may discover that
the developer has an unlimited power to assess them for items completely uncon-
nected with their property; or that prior maintenance charges set by the developer
are vastly inadequate for their intended purpose; or that a central sewer or water
system will be required as lot owners continue to build; or that roads or other
facilities in the development do not comply with local or state requirements,
either for purposes of dedication or otherwise.
In summary, most land developers do not contemplate their perpetual co-
existence in the development which they are marketing. When the land which
they are selling is exhausted they turn elsewhere to new areas to market with the
intention of maintaining any residual obligations in former developments to a
minimum. Since the typical developer's "cash flow" terminates when a develop-
ment is entirely sold, the acquisition of new land and concentration on its market-
ing are indispensable to the company's continued existence. As a result of this
developer exodus, the necessity of disclosing the effects of such an eventuality is
crucial in enabling a prospective purchaser to make an informed judgment to
buy land in a development which carries with it an obligation to be a member of
an association and subject to its regulations. The importance of such disclosure
may be no less critical for a developer. A failure to make a complete disclosure
in this regard may eventually haunt him and may subject him to extensive lot
owner litigation and numerous government sanctions, when his finances can
least afford any adverse intrusions.
VI. Enforcement
In an effort to restore purchasers to as near a position as they would have
occupied by developer compliance, OILSR has had developers making sales or
leases prior to effective registration notify all purchasers that they have a right
to revoke their contracts since they did not receive an effective Property Report
at the time of sale. This notification procedure has resulted in thousands of letters
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being sent by developers accompanied by a copy of a now-effective Property
Report for th& subdivision. Hopefully, possessing such a Report, the purchaser
can now make an informed judgment concerning his purchase. In those cases
where the purchaser has already received a deed the procedure has been adopted
to insist upon the option to reconvey and receive a complete refund of any con-
sideration which has been parted with. In the past, since the developer's failure
to register rested partly from ignorance of the Act or his mistaken belief that his
sales were exempt from the Act, criminal prosecution for wilful violation of the
Act has been seldom recommended. However, since the Act is no longer novel,
such failure to register can now be expected to entail more than mere restoration
of a purchaser to status quo and will be likely to involve injunctive proceedings
and the imposition of criminal penalties under Section 141822 of the Act. Past
experience with purchaser notification has indicated that the percentage of those
exercising their option to revoke or reconvey bears a direct relationship to the
quality of the development and the manner in which the sales were made. Since
many land sale contracts are factored and discounted to financial institutions the
notification procedure is carried over to include those discounted contracts based
on the theory that the right of revocation continues under the assignment and is
available against third parties. Parenthetically, the right of revocation in a
purchaser has been interpreted to be personal in nature and would not be
available to an assignee or vendee of the contract from the original purchaser.
In some cases, even though a developer has an effective filing with the
OILSR, if it can be shown that the filing or accompanying Property Report has
been materially defective, purchasers receiving such a defective Property Report
have also been notified of their right to revoke on the theory that the Report
was so defective as to constitute no Report whatsoever.
To date there have been no formal suspension hearings conducted by
OILSR. There have been various occasions, however, where a developer has
voluntarily suspended an effective Statement of Record or voluntarily withdrawn
applications for Statements or Consolidations. It has been and continues to be
our philosophy that if compliance can be achieved through such means recourse
to formal hearings is an unnecessary burden for both developers and us.
In attempting to resolve the status of a developer under the Act, where the
developer does not come forward with affirmative information or where there is
reason to believe that such information is inaccurate, written interrogatories will
be directed to the developer or his counsel. The interrogatories are designed to
elicit pertinent facts concerning the developer. They do not represent a con-
clusion or a presumption that the developer is within the purview of the Act.
Where there is a failure to respond to the interrogatory, normally subpoenas
duces tecum or ad testificandum will be issued to compel the production of
pertinent written documents and materials disclosing the type of development
involved. If the subpoenas are not obeyed or involve contumacy, the OILSR
will proceed to seek a court order requiring the production of the relevant in-
formation. Currently, two injunctions have been secured against developers, one
of whom has been recommended for criminal prosecution.
22 Id. at § 1717.
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It is a known fact that many developers do not allow purchasers a sufficient
opportunity to read and examine the Property Report prior to signing a contract
of sale. Based upon complaints received by the OILSR, the Report is often
furnished simultaneous or just subsequent to the signing of the contract by the-
purchaser as one more document in a bundle of others. Virtually all of the
contracts provide (as is permitted by the Act) that the buyer acknowledges by his
signature that he has received, read and understood the Report and thereby
waives the right to revoke. Thus, even if a purchaser has received no Property
Report whatsoever, his signature says that he has. When a pattern of complaints
against a particular developer consistently claim a lack of opportunity to review
the Report, the OILSR takes the position that this is the developer's standard
practice. A developer is reprimanded to this effect and is requested to advise all
purchasers who were not provided with a meaningful delivery of the Report that
they may now revoke their contract.
VII. Hearings
The hearing procedures are nearing final form. Proposed Regulations were
published in the Federal Register, January 21, 1971 (pages 985 to 994). Re-
visions are being made since we wish to keep the procedures as simple as possible
and yet in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act. The procedural
Regulations will be Part 1720 of 24 CFR. Compliance to date has been achieved
on a voluntary basis and we anticipate that even after the procedural Regula-
tions are in effect, that compliance will be for the most part done through consent
orders without formal hearings.
VIII. Legal and Quasi-legal Questions
More than a few legal questions, whose conclusive resolution can only be
speculated upon until precedent is established or until the matter has received
judicial pronouncement, have arisen regarding the Act and its interpretation.
One such question involves the application and effect of the common law doctrine
of "merger" upon purchasers' rights under the Act. Some developers and their
counsel have argued that the delivery of a deed to a purchaser effectively ex-
tinguishes any rights of revocation or voidability which a purchaser may other-
wise have had under a prior contract of sale. Since Section 1404(b) 21 of the
Act states that a purchaser may void or revoke his contract if he is not furnished
a Property Report prior to or at the time of sale, failure to receive such a Report
would normally allow him to get out of his contract. However, in view of the
doctrine of "merger," it is argued that since the right of revocation contained in
the contract of sale is not a term in the deed, the delivery of the deed discharges
the contract and eliminates the right of revocation and voidability. In support
of this argument the theory is advanced that the Act provides such a purchaser
with a right of recovery under Section 1410,24 which is an entirely adequate
remedy; and also, that the main intent of the Act was to ensure that a buyer
23 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1703(b) (1971 Cure. Supp.).
24 Id. at § 1709.
['December, 1971]
GOVERNMENT IN LAND DEVELOPMENT SALES
receives a deed to the property which he purchases. It has always been and
remains the position of the OILSR that no purchaser rights of revocation or
voidability are lost by the mere delivery of a deed. It is not felt that the remedy
provided by Section 1410 is entirely adequate since the Congressional Hearings
which preceded the Act continually reflect that defrauded buyers either cannot
afford, or do not consider employing counsel, and indeed, would not be in the
position they now find themselves in, if they were the type that employs legal
counsel. Also, the Hearings manifestly disclose that the Congress did not merely
intend that buyers should be ensured delivery of a deed. As a matter of fact, they
contain examples of extreme fraud where buyers did receive deeds, but the
property conveyed was either swampland, under water, or subject to a flood-
control easement. Traditionally, the concept of "merger" has been applied to
those situations where a party to a contract of sale complains that the delivery of
a deed does not represent full performance of the contract and constitutes a
breach of that contract. The courts have indicated that those terms not specifi-
cally carried over into the deed become merged into the deed and cannot then be
reasserted. However, the number of exceptions to the application of the doctrine
are multiple. Such exceptions partly consist of the preservation of terms which are
collateral to, or distinct from, the subject matter of the contract. The courts have
said:
The many exceptions to the doctrine of merger are for the most part
applied in cases where either the grantor or grantee is attempting to enforce
against the other, stipulations in the antecedent contract which are not con-
tained in, not performed by, and not inconsistent with the deed, and which
are held to be collateral to or independent of the obligation to convey.25
And further:
In all cases then where there are stipulations in a preliminary contract
for the sale of land, of which the conveyance is not a performance the true
question must be whether the parties have intentionally surrendered those
stipulations. The evidence of that intent may exist in or out of the deed. If
plainly expressed in the very terms of the deed, the evidence will be decisive.
If not so expressed the question is open to other evidence, and I think in the
absence of all proof there is no presumption that either party in giving or
accepting a conveyance, intends to give up the benefits of the covenants of
which the conveyance is not a performance or satisfaction.26
It should be self-evident that a purchaser who does not receive a Property
Report at the time of sale, who has no indication that he has a right under law
to receive such a Report, and who has no knowledge that failure to receive such
a Report entitles him to revoke his contract, can hardly be concluded to have
intended to give up the benefit of receiving the Report and the benefit of such a
stipulation in his contract. It has been held that the doctrine of merger is in-
applicable in a situation which involved a contract for the sale of land containing
a clause by which the seller agreed to repurchase the land at the buyer's option.2
The court said that the contract antecedent to the deed clearly showed that there
25 Snyder v. Roberts, 45 Wash.2d 865, 872, 278 P.2d 348 (1955).
26 Morris v. Whitcher, 20 N.Y. 41, 47 (1859).
27 Siebros Finance Corp. v. Kerman, 232 App. Div. 375, 249 N.Y.Supp. 497 (1931).
[Vol. 47: 267]
278 NOTRE DAME LAWYER [December, 19711
was no intention on the part of the parties that the repurchase option in the
vendee should be merged in the deed and as a result such merger was not effected.
It is submitted that a contract containing an option to void or revoke is analogous
to one with an option to reconvey. Naturally, if the revocation language does not
appear at all in the antecedent contract, as required by the Act, it seems obvious
that the doctrine of merger in such a case is entirely irrelevant. Finally, it is
almost universally held that the doctrine of merger is inapplicable where there
is the presence of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment of fact and that such
facts of which a party has no knowledge or of which he was misinformed do not
merge into the deed.
IX. Liaison with States
Notwithstanding the admonition of Section 140928 of the Act, requiring
cooperation with state authorities similarly concerned with regulating the sale
of land, it is apparent that OILSR would so proceed of its own accord. Since the
passage of the federal legislation, a growing number of states have become in-
creasingly vigilant in protecting their citizens as prospective consumers of sub-
divided land. These efforts include the passage of new legislation or indirect
enforcement under state real estate commissions, existing plat approval statutes,
environmental control agencies, or investigation and compliance procedures
handled directly through the state departments of justice.
A number of states have recently enacted statutes requiring registration by
developers with their state and the distribution of a document to prospective
purchasers, all of which may be virtually satisfied by a developer's effective filing
under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act.29 In addition to these states,
and those "acceptable" states under Section 1710.25"° of the Regulations (Flor-
ida, New York, California and Hawaii) a number of other states require registra-
tion of one form or another, sometimes under the state division of securities, or
with an appropriate real estate licensing agency." Some of these states do not,
however, provide any regulation whatsoever where the land which is being
offered has its situs within that state and do not provide for the delivery of any
report or offering statement to prospective purchasers. A few of these states have
recently begun to detect the danger of allowing their land to be indiscriminately
developed and marketed, even though the prospective danger to their citizens is
lessened by the proximity of the land. They have also discerned the weakness of
a state statute which does not require registration by "nominal" owners of the
land who are really mere brokers. Other states require various forms of state
approval short of actual registration and have no document for distribution to
prospective purchasers.32 The remaining states successfully regulate the sale of
subdivision land only to the extent to which the state attorney general or allied
28 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1708 (1971 Gum. Supp.).
29 E.g., Alaska, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Nevada, North Dakota, New Hampshire.
30 Interstate Land Sales Registration, 24 C.F.R. § 1710.25 (1970).
31 E.g., Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, South Carolina
and Wisconsin.
32 E.g., Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebras-
ka, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington and North Carolina.
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state departments wish to involve themselves.33 Other than the exchange of
information relating to whether a particular developer has filed with a state or
with OILSR, or to the extent that either has information concerning a developer,
the primary liaison with states has been their submission of information relating
to developer compliance with local requirements involving health, safety and
welfare. Numerous amendments to effective OILSR filings have been required
as a result of the disclosure of data by the states relating to the deficiency of a
developer's prior disclosure. Such data include failure by a developer to comply
with state regulations relating to sewage disposal, water facilities, road or street
maintenance, street dedication, and escrow or bonding specifications. Several
states have been especially helpful by their prompt exercise of injunctive powers
in stopping questionable land sale promotions where immediate federal interven-
tion was impracticable.
State expertise has played an invaluable role in educating those charged
with the administration of the federal legislation. An anecdote recalled by a
prominent state official characterizes the immense task of protecting unknowing
purchasers of land. The official described a meeting with a land buyer who
just discovered his lot was under water. The official advised him to go back to
the seller. When the official asked him upon his return how he had mac4 out -
the buyer replied that he now had bought two lots, both under water.
X. Proposed Amendments to the Act
The more notable contemplated changes in the Act include, first, an amend-
ment increasing the number of lots from 49 to 99 under Section 1402(3)," in
an effort to relieve smaller developments from filing under the Act. This amend-
ment springs from the conviction of OILSR that a subdivision consisting of less
than 100 lots is either likely to be not in interstate commerce or of such limited
character as not to warrant the expenditure of time better devoted to the more
numerous large developments and their utilization of mass-media solicitation.
Also, smaller developments of this number generally tend to scale down the
number and type of promised improvements, thereby lessening the possibility of
deception in this regard. A second proposal calls for the entire deletion of
Section 1403 (a) (2) " which currently exempts the sale of subdivision lots of
five or more acres in size. This amendment is based on the feeling that the offer-
ing of larger acreage merely provides an opportunity to market land which is of
such little value that it can be competitively sold at prices equivalent to that of
smaller acreage. For example, arid desert land becomes of no more value simply
because there is a large amount of it. Zero plus zero still equals zero. However,
the Regulations and the Act are under revision to authorize certain discretionary
exemptions in cases of particular hardship, or where there is no overriding and
legitimate public interest, and, where applicable, such larger acreage may be
exempted on this basis.
33 E.g., Alabama, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming.
34 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1701(3) (1971 Cum. Supp.).
35 Id. at§ 1702(a) (2)
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Thirdly, as a result of considerable developer confusion arising from the
exemption provided by Section 1403 (a) (10),"6 and the difficulty in administering
it, the deletion of this entire subsection is proposed. This amendment is conceived
on the basis that the purpose of the Act goes beyond the insurance of mere
delivery of unencumbered title and has heretofore encouraged various developers
to dilute their developments simply in an effort to fit the exemption's narrow
requirements.
Briefly, other proposed amendments to the Act include:
(1) an attempt to widen the scope of regulatory exemption authority to
permit the exemption of certain types of land sales such as "auctions" and
certain classes of affected persons such as trustees under "dry trusts," both of
which may be technically covered by the Act but which are not felt to come
within the intended purview of the Act;
(2) the inclusion of "foreign" commerce for land in Section 1404(a)"2 to
specifically include all land beyond the borders of the United States and its ter-
ritories and possessions, if such land is being offered to citizens within such
borders;
(3) amendment to Section 1404(a) (1)ss to include "offers" to sell or lease,
to eliminate any question of the jurisdiction of the Act over promotional solicita-
tion occurring prior to the time of the actual sale;
(4) the insertion of appropriate language in Section 1404(b)3 9 to clarify a
purchaser's right of revocation, and to eliminate any conjecture regarding the
duration of this right, as well as to prevent the undue extinguishment of what is
regarded as the purchaser's strongest remedy under the Act. And, in this connec-
tion, a further amendment to this subsection is contemplated, expanding the
period of allowable revocation from 48 hours, to three business days or 72 hours,
and elimination of the provision allowing a waiver of the right of revocation.
XI. Conclusion
Although the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act has been in force
for more than two years, its effectiveness in an operational sense has yet to reach
full potential. The reason for this, as stated at the outset of this article, is due in
part to the legal profession's lack of knowledge with the nature of this legislation
and the consequent erroneous legal advice that the profession has given to
developers and consumers alike. No doubt much of the confusion is due to the
language in which the Act is drafted, the newness of the statute, and the absence
of precedent. It is the feeling of this Office that the effectiveness of the Act is
somewhat proportionate to the legal profession's knowledge and familiarity with
the Act. It is to this end-to acquaint the legal profession with the administrative
implementation of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act-that this
article has been directed.
36 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702(a)(10) (1971 Cum.
Supp.).
37 Id. at § 1703(a).
38 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1703(a) (1) (1971 Cum.
Supp.).
39 Id. at § 1703(b).
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